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We consider the effect of inducement to vaccinate during the spread of an infectious disease on complex
networks. Suppose that public resources are finite and that only a small proportion of individuals can be vac-
cinated freely (complete subsidy), for the remainder of the population vaccination is a voluntary behavior —
and each vaccinated individual carries a perceived cost. We ask whether the classical targeted subsidy strat-
egy is definitely better than the random strategy: does targeting subsidy at individuals perceived to be with
the greatest risk actually help? With these questions, we propose a model to investigate the interaction effects
of the subsidy policies and individuals responses when facing subsidy policies on the epidemic dynamics on
complex networks. In the model, a small proportion of individuals are freely vaccinated according to either
the targeted or random subsidy policy, the remainder choose to vaccinate (or not) based on voluntary principle
and update their vaccination decision via an imitation rule. Our findings show that the targeted strategy is only
advantageous when individuals prefer to imitate the subsidized individuals’ strategy. Otherwise, the effect of the
targeted policy is worse than the random immunization, since individuals preferentially select non-subsidized
individuals as the imitation objects. More importantly, we find that under the targeted subsidy policy, increasing
the proportion of subsidized individuals may increase the final epidemic size. We further define social cost as
the sum of the costs of vaccination and infection, and study how each of the two policies affect the social cost.
Our result shows that there exist some optimal intermediate regions leading to the minimal social cost.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le, 05.65.+b
I. INTRODUCTION
Vaccination is the most effective response to large-scale
epidemic outbreaks, such as seasonal influenza and influenza
like epidemics. Vaccination both limits the extent of the out-
break and reduces morbidity and mortality [1, 2]. However,
electing to take vaccination brings certain side effects or in-
conveniences; while protecting not only those who are vac-
cinated but also their neighbors, and leading to the so-called
effect of “herd-immunity”. This scenario naturally leads to the
problem of “free-riding” commonly observed in public goods
studies [3]. Recently, by incorporating evolutionary game the-
ory into traditional epidemiological models, many researchers
have demonstrated that a voluntary vaccination policy without
incentives may be unable to eradicate a vaccine-preventable
disease [4–10]. One possible way of solving the social
dilemma with respect to vaccination is for the government or
health organizations to offer some incentive programs, e.g.,
subsidy and insurance policies [11, 12].
Since many diseases spread through human populations by
physical contact between infected individuals and suscepti-
ble individuals, the pattern of these disease-causing contact
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forms a network. In the past decades, network-based epidemi-
ological models have attracted myriad attention and many
significant results have been achieved [13–19]. To control
the epidemic spreading on complex networks, many well-
studied immunization strategies have been proposed, such
as targeted immunization [20] and acquaintance immuniza-
tion [21]. Compared to a random immunization strategy, these
two immunization strategies have been proven to be more ef-
ficient in controlling the spread of epidemic diseases on com-
plex networks. However, the results were obtained by the two
implicit assumptions: 1) there are enough public resources to
vaccinate many individuals; 2) the behavioral responses of the
remaining individuals are not considered. In reality, public re-
source limitations mean that government agencies can usually
only freely vaccinate a small proportion of people. The re-
maining population decide whether or not to take vaccination
according to a voluntary principle — and subject to an asso-
ciated vaccination cost. In this case, the vaccination decision
of the remaining people is dependent on the risk of infection,
prevalence of infection, the cost of vaccination, public opinion
and so on [22]. In particular, their vaccination decisions are
sensitively influenced by the proportion of subsidized individ-
uals as well as which kinds of individuals are subsidized. For
example, if some hub nodes are freely immunized, the nodes
with small degrees have small probability of being infected
due to the herd immunity effect from these hub nodes, as a re-
sult, many nodes are unwilling to take vaccination, leading to
an increase in the final epidemic size. Therefore, we need to
reconsider whether the classical targeted subsidy policy (i.e.,
2targeted immunization under which certain individuals with
the highest degree are freely immunized) is still better than
the random case [12, 23].
In this paper, a vaccination decision model with a prefer-
ential selection mechanism based on game theory is estab-
lished to investigate the interplay of the subsidy policy, the
voluntary vaccination decision and the spreading dynamics on
networks. We then compare the effects of the targeted sub-
sidy policy with the random policy on the vaccination and
epidemic dynamics. We find that the preferential selection
mechanism plays a vital role on whether the targeted subsidy
policy yields ideal results. We show that the advantage of the
targeted policy is greatly increased when the non-subsidized
individuals prefer to select the subsidized individuals as im-
itation objects. However, the control effect of the targeted
policy is even worse than that of the random policy when
non-subsidized individuals randomly or preferentially select
other non-subsidized nodes as their imitation objects. More
importantly, we find that, for the targeted policy, increasing
the subsidy proportion may increase rather than reduce the fi-
nal epidemic size when non-subsidized individuals are prefer-
entially selected, it is because that a small subsidy proportion
may greatly reduce the vaccination willingness of the non-
subsidized individuals. In addition, by defining the social cost
as the sum of the costs of vaccination and infection, we find
that the social cost non-monotonically depends on the subsi-
dized proportion p for both subsidy policies. Our findings in-
dicate that the effects of well-designed subsidy policies may
be undermined or counter-productive if the policies are im-
plemented without considering the intricate human behavioral
responses, such as neglecting the non-subsidized individuals’
responses on the subsidy policies.
In Sec. II, we describe our model of epidemic spreading on
complex networks by integrating game theory. In Sec. III, we
present our main results concerning the effects of the two sub-
sidy policies on the vaccination coverage, the final epidemic
size and the social cost. Meanwhile, an example of influenza
case is given in Sec. IV to demonstrate the applicability of
these results. In Sec. V, we present conclusion and discus-
sions.
II. DESCRIPTIONS OF THE MODEL
Taking into account seasonal flu-like diseases and the lim-
ited effectiveness of vaccines and following previous studies
[4, 24, 25], we model the vaccination dynamics and the epi-
demic as a two-stage process: the first stage is the vaccina-
tion decision stage, which is implemented before each epi-
demic season; the second stage is the epidemic season stage,
where non-vaccinated individuals may be infected by diseases
described by the standard susceptible-infected-removed (SIR)
model. Specifically, at the vaccination stage, except for a pro-
portion p of individuals who are freely vaccinated (according
to either the targeted strategy or the random strategy), each
individual needs to decide whether or not to take vaccination.
Choosing to take vaccination will incur a cost CV [the cost of
vaccination can account for the monetary cost of the vaccine,
the perceived vaccine risks, side effects, long-term healthy im-
pacts, and so forth] regardless of the non-subsidized or subsi-
dized individuals (the vaccination cost of the subsidized indi-
viduals is CV though they need not pay the cost themselves
[42]). We also assume that the vaccine can perfectly pro-
tect vaccinated individuals from infection in the following epi-
demic season. The second stage is the epidemic season stage,
during which each unvaccinated individual has a probability
of being infected during the season. In this stage the epidemic
strain infects an initial number I0 of individuals, and the dis-
ease spreads according to SIR dynamics with daily transmis-
sion rate λ and recovery rate µ. The epidemic continues until
there are no more newly infected individuals. An individual
who gets infected during the epidemic season pays a cost CI .
Without loss of generality, we set CI = 1 and let c = CV /CI
describe the relative cost of vaccination, whose value is re-
stricted in the region of [0, 1] [24, 26]. Those individuals who
are neither vaccinated nor infected pay no cost, so they are the
free riders.
Let Pi(t) be the current payoff of individual i at season t.
According to the above descriptions, i takes one of the three
cost values as follows
Pi(t) =


−c, vaccination;
−1, infected; (1)
0, free-rider.
After the last epidemic season, individuals can update their
strategies again in the following vaccination decision stage
based on their previous experiences. Considering that imita-
tion phenomena commonly exist in the real world [27, 28],
many studies have investigated the impact of an imitation
rule from the game theoretical perspective as well as in the
vaccination decision-making epidemiological models [2, 24].
Hence, we also assume individuals update their strategies
based on an imitation rule. Specifically, if an individual i
updates her vaccination strategy, she randomly chooses an im-
mediate neighbor j with which to compare their expected pay-
off, and then adopts j’s strategy with a probability dependent
on their payoff difference [24, 29]:
W (si ← sj) =
1
1 + exp[−β(Pj(t)− Pi(t))]
, (2)
where si = 1 or 0 denotes the vaccination choice for individ-
ual i: either vaccinated or not, where β describes the rational-
ity of the individuals. Unless otherwise stated, we let β = 10
in this paper, implying that better-performing individuals are
readily imitated, but it is still possible to adopt the behavior of
an individual performing worse.
When the subsidy policies from the governments or health
organizations are included, it is difficult to be definitive over
whether individuals choose to imitate subsidized or non-
subsidized individuals. For example, some individuals may
prefer to imitate the subsidized individuals’ strategies since
these subsidized individuals are chosen by authoritative orga-
nizations. Conversely, some individuals are willing to imi-
tate non-subsidized individuals’ strategies since their strate-
gies come from their self-choices but not from the external
3environments. In view of this, we introduce a selection param-
eter α to differentiate the preferential selection rule. In detail,
we first give a different weight value w = 1 (w = 5) for non-
subsidized (subsidized) individuals[43], then the probability
of node i choosing neighbor j is given as:
f(i← j) = e
αwj∑
k∈Λi
eαwk
, (3)
here Λi denotes the neighborhood of node i and wi is the
weight of node i. For α < 0, non-subsidized neighbors are
more likely to be selected as the potential strategy objects. On
the contrary, for α > 0, individuals tend to select subsidized
neighbors as potential imitation objects. Neighbors are ran-
domly selected as α = 0, which returns to the original model.
Our main aim is to explore how the value of α affects the vac-
cination coverage, the final epidemic size and the social cost
in regard with the two different subsidy policies.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In our simulations, for targeted subsidy policy, a proportion
p of individuals with the highest degrees are freely vaccinated,
for the random subsidy policy, a proportion p of individuals of
individuals is randomly selected and freely vaccinated. Then
equal fractions of vaccinated and non-vaccinated individuals
are randomly distributed among a proportion 1−p of individu-
als to start the iterative process. Meanwhile, the number of ini-
tially infected individuals in each epidemic season is I0 = 5.
The long run equilibrium results are obtained by averaging
the last 1000 iterations of a total of 3000 iterations in 100
independent realizations. Our results are implemented on net-
works generated from the standard configuration model [30]
with degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−3. The size of the network
studied is N = 2000, the minimal and maximal degrees are
kmin = 3 and kmax =
√
N , respectively. Finally, in Sec.
IV we also study a practical case by using the email network
to validate the generality of the results and demonstrate the
application of this approach.
Before comparing the two subsidy policies’ effects on the
vaccination coverage (V ) and the final epidemic size (R), we
first investigate how the pure immunization strategy (we also
say subsidy policy in the following context, only p propor-
tion of individuals is immunized, the remaining individuals do
nothing) and the pure vaccination decision dynamics (without
the subsidy policy, i.e., p = 0) affect the epidemic dynam-
ics, respectively. The targeted immunization strategy (labelled
TAR in the following figures) and the random immunization
strategy (labelled RAN in the following figures) are compared
in Fig. 1(a). As provided in previous work, Fig. 1(a) shows
that the targeted immunization strategy can better control the
outbreaks of epidemics when the resources are sufficient, and
can be eliminated completely once p ≈ 0.18. Furthermore,
the vaccination coverage V and the final epidemic size R ver-
sus the cost of vaccination c are given in Fig. 1(b), one can
find that the value of V decreases with the value of c, leading
to a corresponding increase of R.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) (a) For the pure immunization strategy, com-
parison of the effects the targeted immunization (or subsidy) strategy
and the random immunization strategy on the final epidemic size R;
(b) the final epidemic size R and the vaccination coverage V as func-
tions of the cost of vaccination c when the subsidy proportion p = 0.
In this and the following figures, unless otherwise specified, we let
λ = 0.2 and µ = 0.25 to calibrate the epidemic size near 0.9 when
there are no protective measures.
In the following, we want to know what new phenomena
can be produced when the subsidy policies and the vaccina-
tion decisions from an individual’s voluntary behaviors are
integrated. Fig. 2 gives the final epidemic size (see Fig. 2(a))
and the vaccination coverage (including the subsidized indi-
viduals and the vaccinated individuals decided by themselves,
see Fig. 2(b)) as functions of the parameterα for different sub-
sidy policies as well as the different values of p. As shown in
Fig. 2(b), for α > 0, the vaccination coverage is enhanced and
the larger value of p gives rise to the greater enhancement of
V for the both subsidy policies. However, one can see that the
vaccination coverage for the targeted policy is enhanced more
significantly, leading to almost the elimination of the epidemic
for the targeted policy (see Fig. 2(a)). On the contrary, for
α ≤ 0, a non-trivial phenomenon appears: the vaccination
coverage for the targeted policy is much lower than the ran-
dom policy, meanwhile, for the targeted policy, larger value of
p yields lower level of vaccination coverage. The non-trivial
phenomenon becomes more remarkable as the value of α is
further decreased. Correspondingly, the control effect of the
targeted policy becomes worse than the random case. This re-
sult suggests that the feel good subsidy policy (targeted sub-
sidy policy) may produce the opposite effect when the indi-
viduals’ responses on subsidy policies are neglected.
To systematically analyze the above phenomena, we first
define the voluntary vaccination probability Vk (excluding the
subsidized individuals) for the nodes with the same degree
k as: Vk = N
v
k /Nk, where Nvk and Nk are the number of
voluntarily vaccinated nodes with degree k and the number
of nodes with degree k, respectively. In Fig. 3(a), we plot
Vk as a function of k for the case of p = 0, i.e., the subsidy
policy is omitted. As illustrated in Fig. 3(a), the probabilityVk
increases with the degree k until to a upper bound (≈ 0.65),
that is to say, the nodes with larger degrees (‘large nodes’ or
hub nodes) are more likely to take vaccination than the ‘small
nodes’ (the nodes with small degrees) even when there is no
any subsidy policy. The reason comes from that the ‘large
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Effects of α on the control effects of the ran-
dom subsidy policy and the targeted subsidy policy for different val-
ues of p: (a) The final epidemic size R versus the select parameter α
for different subsidy policies; (b) the vaccination coverage V versus
the select parameter α for different subsidy policies. Here the cost of
vaccination c = 0.5.
nodes’ have higher risk of infection [6].
We then consider the cases of α = −3, 0 and 3 in Fig. 3(b),
(c) and (d) with p = 0.05. One can observe that, when α < 0
(Fig. 3(b)) or α = 0 (Fig. 3(c)), the value of Vk for the ran-
dom subsidy policy is larger than the targeted case. Note that,
for the targeted case, Vk≥13 = 0 since the nodes with de-
gree k ≥ 13 have been freely vaccinated. As analyzed in
Fig. 3(a), the voluntary vaccination probability for hub nodes
is high even without the subsidy policy, in this situation, the
governments or health organizations still use the limited pub-
lic resource to subsidize these nodes rather than the nodes
who are not willing to take vaccination voluntarily, meaning
that the public resources are somewhat wasted and cannot as
fully stimulate the vaccination enthusiasm of ‘small nodes’.
Meanwhile, for the targeted policy, the non-subsidized nodes
are ‘small nodes’, and they are not willing to take voluntarily
vaccination owing to the low risk of infection. In this case,
the non-vaccinated neighbor nodes have higher probability of
being selected if α < 0, which leads to the low vaccination
coverage for the targeted policy, i.e., the lower value of Vk .
However, for the random subsidy policy, each node has the
same probability to be freely vaccinated, in this case, the hub
nodes with the higher voluntarily vaccination probability [see
Fig. 3(a)] are more likely to be selected by others owing to
their large connectivity even when α ≤ 0, so their vaccination
decision is more likely to be imitated by others. Combining
the above explanations, we can understand why the vaccina-
tion coverage for the targeted policy is much lower than the
random case as α ≤ 0. When α > 0 (Fig. 3(d)), firstly, sub-
sidized individuals are likely to be selected as the imitation
objects, secondly, for the targeted subsidy policy, the subsi-
dized nodes are the hub nodes who have more connectivity
and can be selected by others with larger probability. As a
result, the Vk of the targeted policy is larger than the random
case.
Furthermore, Fig. 4 plots the contour of R (left column of
Fig. 4) and the contour of V (right column of Fig. 4) versus
the parameters α and p for the two subsidy policies. For the
random subsidy policy, one can find that the vaccination cov-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The voluntary vaccination probability Vk as a
function of degree k for the random subsidy policy and the targeted
subsidy policy. (a) the subsidy policy is not considered, i.e., p = 0.
(b) α = −3 and p = 0.05; (c) α = 0 and p = 0.05; (d) α = 3 and
p = 0.05. Here the cost of vaccination c = 0.5.
erage V increases with p and α (see Fig. 4(b)), leading to the
reduction of R when p or α is increased (see Fig. 4(a)). For
the targeted case, a very interesting result can be observed:
for α < 0, the vaccination coverage first decreases with the
parameter p and to a minimal level as p ∈ (0.03, 0.17), and
then the vaccination coverage increases again with further in-
crease in the value of p (see Fig. 4(d)). Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 3(b)
have shown the targeted subsidy policy cannot improve but
will inhibit the vaccination coverage as α ≤ 0, which can ex-
plain why the vaccination coverage is reduced at first. With
the further increase of p, there are more vaccinated individu-
als even when the number of the voluntarily vaccinated indi-
viduals is negligible, so the vaccination coverage is increased
again. The existence of the minimal vaccination coverage
leads to the maximal final epidemic size as p ∈ (0.03, 0.08)
and α < −2(see Fig. 4(c)), which means that subsidy policy
(p > 0) does not reduce the final epidemic size but makes
the final epidemic size larger than the case of p = 0. More-
over, one can see that the maximal final epidemic size region
(see Fig. 4(c)) is much smaller than the minimal vaccination
coverage region (see Fig. 4(c)). The reason can be deduced
from Fig. 1(a), which indicates that the epidemic has been
controlled to a rather low level as p = 0.1.
From the perspective of group interest, the purpose of in-
troducing subsidy policies is to minimize the total social cost
at the population level. We thus want to know how the social
cost is affected by the two subsidy policies as well as the se-
lection parameter α. To this end, we first define the social cost
as [11, 31]: SC = NR × 1.0 +NV × c with NR and NV be
the number of infected and vaccinated individuals.
In Fig. 5(c) we study the effect of the parameter p on the
value of SC for the random subsidy policy. From Fig. 5(c)
we can find that the value of SC decreases with p as α ≤ 0
(we here restrict p ≤ 0.3 given that the public resources are
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Comparison between the random subsidy pol-
icy and the targeted subsidy policy for the final epidemic size R and
the vaccination coverage V in the full phase diagram (α, p).(a) The
final epidemic size R versus α and p for random policy; (b) the vac-
cination coverage V versus α and p for random policy; (c) the final
epidemic size R versus α and p for targeted policy; and, (d) the vac-
cination coverage V versus α and p for targeted policy. Here the cost
of vaccination c = 0.5.
limited.). However, there exists an optimal value of p lead-
ing to the minimal social cost when α > 0 (2.5 and 5.0). To
explain such a phenomenon, we present the values of R and
V as the functions of p for different values of α in Fig. 5(a)
and Fig. 5(b). One can see that the vaccination coverage V
is not increased remarkably as α < 0, which leads to the fi-
nal epidemic size R not being significantly reduced. Thus we
need to further increase p to reduce the social cost since the
cost of infection is larger than the cost of vaccination. Yet, for
α > 0, from Fig. 5(b) and Fig. 5(a) we can observe that the
vaccination coverage is greatly improved and the R→ 0 once
p > 0.1, which implies that the proportion of subsidy is suffi-
cient to control the outbreak of epidemic, and further increase
the value of p just gives rise to the overload of subsidy.
The effect of subsidy proportion p on the social cost SC
for the targeted policy is illustrated in Fig. 5(f). Note that,
compared with Fig. 5(c), there also exists an optimal value
of p leading to the minimal social cost even for α < 0. As
we know, unlike the random subsidy policy, Fig. 1(a) shows
that the epidemic is almost eliminated by the targeted subsidy
policy as p > 0.15 even without voluntarily vaccinated indi-
viduals. So further increase of p definitely causes a rise in the
social cost. For α > 0, the vaccination coverage increases
with p (see Fig. 5(e)), leading to the rapid decrease of the fi-
nal epidemic size, especially, when p ≈ 0.05, the epidemic is
almost controlled (see Fig. 5(d)). As a result, for α > 0, there
exists an optimal value of p around 0.05 causing the minimal
social cost. Meanwhile, Fig. 5(e) suggests that the optimal
value of p for α > 0 is smaller than the case of α ≤ 0.
The systematic effects of the parameters p andα for the ran-
dom policy and the targeted policy on the social cost are pre-
sented in Fig. 6(a) and (b), respectively. As shown in Fig. 6(a),
the optimal phenomenon only evident when α > 0. However,
for the targeted case, there always exists an optimal value of
p inducing the minimal social cost. Meanwhile, the optimal
value of p becomes larger as the value of α is gradually re-
duced.
IV. APPLICATION: A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE OF
INFLUENZA
To demonstrate the universality of this phenomenon, we
calibrate the parameters of the model based on the scenario of
the 2009 H1N1 influenza epidemic, in which a reproduction
number R0 was estimated as R0 = 1.6 [32–34] and recovery
rate was set to µ = 1.0/3 (i.e., the mean infectious period is
3 days) [24]. It is difficult to obtain the real contact networks
on which the influenza spreads, so without loss of general-
ity, we use an online social network—an email network as a
proxy from which to study the spreading of influenza on so-
cial networks. The email network is composed of N = 1133
nodes and 5451 links. In addition, the cluster coefficient, the
assortative coefficient and the average shortest distance are re-
spectively C = 0.11, r = 0.078 and D = 3.716 [35, 36]. We
further choose the transmission rate λ such that the final epi-
demic size is that of the well-mixed population without vac-
cination. For this purpose, we let λ ≈ 0.085 for the email
network. According to the Refs. [37–39], the cost of vacci-
nation is set cV = $27 [38] and the cost of infection is set
cI = $73 [39].
With the above preparations, we compare the two subsidy
policies with regard to the vaccination coverage, the final epi-
demic size as well as the social cost in Fig. 7. As shown in
Fig. 7, all the phenomena discussed in main text can be ob-
served. Such as, for the targeted policy, decreasing the value
of α leads to the rapid reduction of vaccination coverage and
yields worse control outcomes (see Fig. 7(a) and (b)), increas-
ing the value of p can increase the final epidemic size (see
Fig. 7(d)) as α < 0; For the random subsidy policy, the op-
timal value of p leading to the minimal social cost appears
only when α > 0, but for the targeted case, the optimal phe-
nomenon can appear forα > 0 as well asα ≤ 0. Furthermore,
one case is worthy to be stressed: for the targeted case, there
exists a worst region in which the social cost is the maximal
as p ∈ (0.03, 0.08) and α ∈ [−5,−2].
V. CONCLUSIONS
Targeted immunization strategies have proven to be an effi-
cient measure to control the spread of epidemics on complex
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Given different values of α, the final epidemic size R, the vaccination coverage V and the social cost SC respectively
as a function of p for the random policy and the targeted policy. (a) R versus p for the random policy; (b) V versus p for the random policy;
(c) SC versus p for the random policy; (d) R versus p for the targeted policy; (e) V versus p for the targeted policy; (f) SC versus p for the
targeted policy. Here the cost of vaccination c = 0.5.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The contour of SC as a function of (α, p)
for the random subsidy policy (a) and the targeted subsidy policy,
respectively. Here the cost of vaccination c = 0.5.
networks with heterogenous degree distribution [6, 20, 40].
However, the strategy assumes that the vaccination campaign
is compulsively enforced and the public resources required for
vaccination are sufficient. A more realistic case is that the
public resources are limited and the government or health or-
ganizations can only subsidize a small proportion of individ-
uals — with the remaining individuals left to decide to vacci-
nate or not based on their self-interest [41]. In this situation,
we want to know whether the targeted subsidy policy is still
better than the random subsidy policy. In this paper, by intro-
ducing a preferential selection rule into the epidemiological
model, and via a game-theoretic framework, we have studied
how the preferential selection rule affects the impact of the
targeted subsidy policy and the random subsidy policy on the
vaccination coverage, the final epidemic size as well as the
social cost. Our findings have shown that, when the selection
parameter α > 0, the targeted subsidy policy can produce
positive effects on controlling the spreading of epidemic since
these subsidized hubs’ vaccination strategy is more likely to
be imitated by others. Otherwise, owing to the facts that, on
the one hand, the targeted subsidy policy indirectly reduces
the risk of the remaining nodes and yields the lower vac-
cination willingness of these nodes, on the other hand, the
non-subsidized nodes who are unwilling to take vaccination
are more likely to be imitated when the selection parameter
α ≤ 0, the combing effects cause the control effect of the tar-
geted policy is worse than the random case. In particular, the
introduction of the targeted policy may increase but not reduce
the final epidemic size as α < 0. When considering the im-
pacts of the two subsidy policies on social cost, we found that,
for the random subsidy policy, there exists an optimal value of
subsidy proportion p leading to the minimal social cost when
the selection parameterα < 0. However, for the targeted case,
there always exists an optimal value of p inducing the minimal
social cost irrespective of whether α ≤ 0 or α > 0, and the
optimal value of p becomes larger when the value of α is grad-
ually decreased. To illustrate this model we provide an exam-
ple based on realistic spread of influenza. The results imply
that, on the one hand, how to distribute limited public resource
to yield the best outcomes sensitively depends on human be-
havioral responses; whilst on the other hand, more subsidized
individuals do not necessarily guarantee better control effect.
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Comparison between the random subsidy pol-
icy and the targeted subsidy policy by considering an influenza case
on an email network. (a) the final epidemic size R as a function of
α; (b) the vaccination coverage V as a function of α; (c) the final
epidemic size R as a function of (α, p) for the random case; (d) the
final epidemic size R as a function of (α, p) for the targeted case; (e)
the social cost SC as a function of (α, p) for the random case; (f)
the social cost SC as a function of (α, p) for the targeted case. The
detailed definitions and the values of the other parameters are given
in the main text.
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